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Mormonism, Originalism, and Utah’s Open
Courts Clause
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty-nine states’ constitutions, including Utah’s, have what is
called an open courts or remedies clause. 1 Each state constitution
words the clause somewhat differently, 2 but almost all of them say
something similar to Utah’s constitution: “All courts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay.” 3 State high
courts interpret this clause differently, however, 4 generally falling
into one of two camps. Some courts interpret the clause to provide
only procedural protections similar to those found in the due process
clause of the United States Constitution. But others interpret the
clause to also provide substantive protections, limiting the
legislature’s power to abrogate causes of action and remedies existing

1. Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts
Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1279 (1995). For a comprehensive list of
each state’s clause see Judicial Administration: State Links, NCSC, http://www.ncsc.org/
Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Administration/State-Links.aspx?cat=Constitutional%20
Access%20to%20Justice%20Provisions (last visited Oct. 2014).
2. Compare WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (“Justice in all cases shall be administered
openly, and without unnecessary delay.”), with ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (“Every person shall
find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person,
privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely,
and promptly.”).
3. UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 11; see also ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, §
11; ARK. CONST. art. 1, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. 2, § 6; DEL.
CONST. art. 1, § 9; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 18; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12; IND. CONST. art. 1,
§ 12; KY. CONST. § 14; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 19; MD. CONST. DEC.
RIGHTS, art. 19; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 11; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; MISS. CONST. art. 3,
§ 24; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 14; MONT. CONST. art 2, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 13; N.C.
CONST. art. 1, § 18; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 15; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 15; OKLA. CONST. art.
2, § 6; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 20; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 19; TEX.
CONST. art. 1, § 13; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 17; WYO. CONST. Art. 1, § 8.
4. David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1203–17 (1992)
(discussing various rules and interpretations high courts have given in interpreting their open
courts clause).

JONES.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/10/2016 12:30 PM

2015

at the time of the state constitution’s adoption. 5 How a state
interprets its open courts clause has a large effect on tort reform. 6 It
determines, for example, whether a doctor has to pay $1.25 million
or only $250 thousand for negligently brain damaging a child. 7
Some variations in interpretation can be traced back to the different
wording of each state’s open courts clause, but other variations
cannot. 8 Professor David Schuman suggests that each state look to
its own history to determine the proper interpretation of its open
courts clause. 9 This Comment attempts to find the proper
interpretation of Utah’s open courts clause through a
historical survey.
Currently, the Utah Supreme Court interprets its open courts
clause to grant both procedural and substantive protections. 10 This
interpretation has brought the clause to the forefront of Utah’s tort
reform battle. 11 Plaintiffs have challenged, sometimes successfully,
statutes of repose, 12 statutory caps on damages, 13 governmental

5. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1204 (Utah
1999) (Stewart, J., concurring).
6. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1280 (“Since legislative tort reform efforts have
intensified in recent years, the open courts clause has become an important weapon for
litigants battling to restrain the legislature’s power to modify common-law remedies.”). Tort
reform refers to legislative reform attempts by business to limit what is seen as overreaching by
plaintiffs and trial attorneys. Examples of tort reform statutes include shorter statutes of
limitation, statutes of repose, and caps on damages. To get a feel for the current tort reform
war, see Jonathan D. Glater, To the Trenches: The Tort War is Raging On, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/business/22tort.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
7. See, e.g., Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 137–38 (Utah 2002).
8. Thomas R. Philips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309,
1313 (2003).
9. Schuman, supra note 4, at 1220.
10. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1017 (Utah 2002).
11. Gordon L. Roberts & Sharrieff Shah, What is Left of Berry v. Beech—The Utah
Open Courts Jurisprudence?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 677, 677–80 (2005).
12. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985) (holding statute of
repose unconstitutional under open courts clause); Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d
1087, 1094 (Utah 1989) (holding builders and architects statute of repose unconstitutional
under open courts clause); Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah v. Herm Hughs & Son, Inc., 782
P.2d 188, 194 (Utah 1989) (holding builders’ and architects’ statute of repose
unconstitutional under open courts clause); Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg.
Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1201 (Utah 1999) (holding builder’s statute of repose as constitutional
under open courts clause).
13. Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) (holding $100,000 cap on
damages unconstitutional after reviewing open courts clause in relation to equal protection and
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immunity, 14 the Wrongful Life Act, 15 the Good Samaritan Act, 16 and
the abrogation of the cause of action for loss-of-consortium. 17
The Utah Supreme Court gives a substantive interpretation to
the open courts clause based on two historical assumptions: (1)
Utah’s founding generation adopted the clause to prevent big
business from corrupting the legislature, 18 and (2) Utah’s founding
generation understood the clause to protect all causes of action ever
recognized in the state’s history, including common-law causes of
action. 19 This Comment argues that the court’s interpretation is
wrong because the two historical assumptions this interpretation
relies upon are false. Instead, Utah history shows that the proper
interpretation of the open courts clause is procedural because that is
the original meaning of the clause. 20
In Part II of this Comment, I briefly review the Utah Supreme
Court’s inquiries into the history of the open courts clause. I begin
with Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 21 the case establishing the court’s
two-pronged test, and finish with Laney v. Fairview City, 22 the case
where the court finally adopts a historical theory for its
interpretation. Part III addresses and then rejects the two historical
assumptions the court’s interpretation relies upon. I address each
assumption separately by first presenting evidence supporting the
due process clauses); Judd. v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 141 (Utah 2004) (holding statutory cap
on damages as constitutional under open courts clause).
14. Laney, 57 P.3d at 1027 (holding Utah Governmental Immunity Act’s redefinition
of “governmental function” unconstitutional under open courts clause); Debry v. Noble, 889
P.2d 428, 442 (Utah 1995) (holding core governmental actions outside the protection of the
open courts clause); Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1162–66 (Utah 1996) (holding action
under Governmental Immunity Act as constitutional and outside the protection of the open
courts clause); Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 628 (Utah 2000) (holding statutory cap and
governmental immunity for firefighter as constitutional under open courts clause).
15. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 443 (Utah 2002) (holding Utah’s
Wrongful Life statute constitutional under open courts clause).
16. Hirpa v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 794 (Utah 1997) (holding Utah’s Good
Samaritan Act as constitutional under open courts clause).
17. Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 871 (Utah 1980) (holding statute abolishing lossof-consortium cause of action as constitutional under open courts clause).
18. See infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
20. In looking to the original meaning, this Article is not looking to the original intent
of the drafters, so it will not address certain arguments in that regard.
21. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670.
22. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002).
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assumption and then evidence opposing the assumption, evaluating
the court’s interpretation in the process. Evidence for both sides
comes from the opinions of Utah Supreme Court justices, outside
writings by scholars, and my own independent research. Part IV then
addresses the proper interpretation of the open courts clause given
Utah’s founding generation’s unique history and what they would
have known about the clause. The evidence shows that Utah’s
founding generation would have understood the open courts clause
to protect access to the courts, procedural due process rights, and
vested rights. Part V concludes.
II. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE OPEN
COURTS CLAUSE
The Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation of the open courts
clause relies on little historical research and questionable
assumptions. Utah first entered the open courts clause debate in
Berry, the case establishing the court’s complex, two-pronged test. 23
Berry provided little, if any, evidence as to why the court’s
interpretation was in line with the clause’s original public meaning.
And subsequent cases did little to back up Berry’s assumptions. It
was not until Laney—decided seventeen years after Berry—that the
court settled on a historical basis for its interpretation.
Berry dealt with the constitutionality of a statute of repose. 24
After the plaintiff’s husband was killed in an airplane accident, she
filed suit against both the owner of the plane and the manufacturer.
But the statute of repose barred the claim against the manufacturer.
Under the statute, claims had to be brought within ten years of the
date of manufacture; however, the plaintiff’s claims were brought
twenty-three years after the date of manufacture. 25 The court
concluded that the statute of repose violated both Utah’s wrongful
death clause and Utah’s open courts clause. 26
Utah’s open courts clause reads:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
23.
24.
25.
26.

814
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Id.
Id. at 686.
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of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party. 27

To determine whether the remedies portion had been violated,
the court fashioned a complex, two-pronged test by asking: 28 (1)
Does the statute provide a substitute remedy of equal value? If yes,
the statute does not violate the open courts clause. If no, the court
moves to the second prong; (2) Is there is a clear social or economic
evil? And is abrogation of the remedy or cause of action either an
arbitrary or unreasonable means of eliminating that evil? If yes, the
statute violates the clause and is unconstitutional. If no, the clause
is satisfied.
In relying on this test, the court made a key but unexpressed
assumption: that the word “injury” in the clause refers to all causes
of action ever recognized in the state’s history, in particular
common-law causes of action (“common law interpretation”). 29
Alternatively, “injury” could refer to all causes of action currently
recognized by law—statute or common law (“current law
interpretation”). 30 If the assumption in Berry is correct, the test is
obviously necessary and certain types of injuries are protected
regardless of the legislature’s recognition of them. But if the
assumption in Berry is wrong, the test becomes wholly unnecessary.
The only types of injuries protected are those defined by current law,
including statutes and common-law rules not overridden by statute.
No injury means no required remedy. And no required remedy
means no need for questions about substitute remedies and sufficient
justifications for eliminating remedies. 31 Which interpretation, if

27. UTAH CONST. art 1, § 11 (emphasis added).
28. Berry, 717 P.2d at 680.
29. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1236 (Utah
1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 1237. A third alternative is to interpret “injury” to mean every injury—legal
or not. But “[t]he law simply does not recognize that every harm suffered should be
compensated. The principle damnum absque injuria, that there can be damage without the
violation of a legal right, is too well established in our jurisprudence to give such an expansive
interpretation to the obscure phrasing of the open courts provision.” Id. at 1236.
31. Id. at 1237–39 (explaining the result of current law interpretation of “injury”).
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either, is correct? The answer depends on how Utah’s founding
generation would have interpreted the word “injury.” 32
As stated before, Berry was based upon an unexpressed
assumption. The court merely noted that the clause “originated with
the Magna Carta and ‘Sir Edward Coke’s Gloss on Chapter 29.’” 33
But it inquired little, if at all, into the clause’s original meaning to
Utah’s founding generation.
The Utah Supreme Court did not explore that question until
after Berry was decided. It was not until Ross v. Schackel that the
court’s interpretation was challenged as being out of step with
Utah’s founding generation’s interpretation. 34 The petitioner,
Schackel, contended that the clause was meant to restrict only the
judiciary, not the legislature, giving credence to the current law
interpretation. Schackel based his claim on Utah history, which
showed a political climate of distrust for courts at the time of the
constitution’s adoption. But the court ignored his contention
holding it unnecessary to address because Berry actually supported
Schackel’s case. 35
Then, in Craftsman, one of Berry’s most loyal supporters, 36
Justice Zimmerman, changed his vote and concluded that Berry
should be overturned. 37 Justice Zimmerman argued and provided
evidence that Utah had “a history, prior to statehood, of abjuring
the common law entirely,” 38 undermining the court’s common-law
interpretation. He pointed to two Utah territorial statutes that
limited or abrogated the common law. Responding to Justice
Zimmerman’s claims, Justice Stewart wrote a concurrence
countering that “[t]he warp and the woof of the law in the Territory
was the common law.” 39 He cited three Utah Territory Supreme
Court cases which concluded that the common law had been
adopted in the territory. He also noted that Utah adopted its
32. See infra text accompanying notes 44–46.
33. Berry, 717 P.2d at 674.
34. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Utah 1996).
35. Id.
36. Roberts & Shah, supra note 11, at 688 (noting that Justice Zimmerman was a
“strong advocate”).
37. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Better Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1224 (Utah
1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 1236.
39. Id. at 1210 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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constitution during the progressive era when states were trying to
curb legislative power because of political corruption by big
business. 40 “[This corruption] no doubt influenced the Utah
Framers,” Justice Stewart wrote. 41 The debate between the two
justices was relegated to separate concurring opinions. 42 The court in
Craftsman did not overturn Berry or decide what historical theory
supported it. But Justice Stewart’s approach eventually won the day
with the court.
In Laney, some seventeen years after Berry, the court adopted
Justice Stewart’s historical theory to support its interpretation. 43
Writing for the majority, Justice Durham declared that
“[c]onstitutional language must be viewed in context, meaning that
its history and purpose must be considered in determining its
meaning.” 44 In the case of the open courts clause, “[t]he
constitution’s drafters understood that the normal political processes
would not always protect the common law right of all citizens to
obtain remedies for injuries.” 45 Thus, the history and purpose behind
Utah’s open courts clause was to prevent “misuse of political
influence by railroads and other corporate interests, who convinced
[other] state legislators to favor private interests through
legislative enactments.” 46
III. WHY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION
IS WRONG
The Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation of the open courts
clause relies upon two historical assumptions: (1) Utah’s founding
generation adopted the clause to prevent special interests from
corrupting the legislature, and (2) Utah’s founding generation
believed the clause would have this effect because they gave a
common-law interpretation to the clause. But historical research
shows neither of these assumptions to be true. The first is unlikely.
And the second is absurd.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 1208–09.
Id. at 1209.
See id.
Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002).
Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1017.
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A. The Special Interests Assumption
As will be shown, it is unlikely that Utah’s founding generation
adopted the open courts clause to stop special interests from
corrupting the legislature. The only historical support for this
assumption is that other states had these concerns and that Utah was
aware of them. But Utahns trusted the legislature more than any
other branch of government. Their reasons for restricting legislative
power are much more nuanced than the court suggests. Further, the
court offers no evidence directly linking the clause to Utahns’
awareness of other states’ concerns. In fact, these states—whose
experiences Utahns were allegedly relying upon when adopting the
clause—did not even rely on the open courts clause to resolve their
own concerns; they adopted different clauses. Thus, it is more likely
than not that Utahns adopted the clause for reasons other than to
prevent special interests from corrupting the legislature.
1. The argument in support of the special interests assumption
The Laney court notes that Utah adopted its constitution during
the progressive era. 47 In the United States, big business—railroads
and mining corporations—exercised substantial political control over
state legislatures. 48 Through that control, they were able to obtain
special privileges and favorable laws. 49 As a result, citizens of states
had grown to distrust their legislatures and sought to restrict their
power when adopting new constitutions. 50 For example, in
Kentucky’s constitutional convention, one delegate is recorded as
saying “the principal, if not the sole purpose of the constitution
which we are here to frame, is to restrain [the Legislature’s] will and
restrict its authority.” 51 Progressives “allied [themselves] with

47. See MARTIN B. HICKMAN, THE UTAH CONSTITUTION: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT 18 (1969) (explaining that the progressive era influenced Utah’s Labor Article).
48. Craftsman, 974 P.2d at 1208–09 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Johnny J.S.
Sorensen, Comment, Adios Statute of Repose: A Temporary Aberration in Constitutional
Interpretation, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1101, 1107–08 (1994)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Perkins v. Ne. Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Ky. 1991) (quoting Legislative
Research Commission, Research Report No. 137, 161 (Jan. 1987)).
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prolabor interests,” 52 pushing constitutional delegates to grant
greater protections for remedies and causes of action in states like
Kentucky and Arizona. 53
The court argues that Utahns were aware of these problems and,
through the constitution, went to work restricting their own
legislature to prevent the abuses seen in other states. 54 For example,
the court argues that Utah’s constitution prohibits “special laws . . .
where general laws could apply, but went on to list eighteen specific
cases where there should be no private or special laws (Art. VI, sec.
26).” 55 Numerous other sections restricted the legislature’s power as
well. 56 Utah also did not adopt clauses found in other states’
constitutions that were more clearly procedural instead of
substantive. 57 For example, Washington’s clause simply states that
“[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without
unnecessary delay.” 58 There is no guarantee of a remedy for every
injury. Additionally, if the clause were viewed as providing only
procedural protections, it “is redundant and mere surplusage—it has
no constitutional role or function that is not already performed by
[Utah’s due process clause].” 59 Thus, the court declares, it is obvious
that “[Utah’s framers] did not intend to so limit the rights
guaranteed to the citizens of Utah.” 60

52. Craftsman, 974 P.2d at 1208–09 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Sorensen,
supra note 48, at 1107–08).
53. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1017 (Utah 2002) (relying on the histories of
Kentucky and Arizona as found in Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 811–12, and Kenyon v. Hammer,
688 P.2d 961, 971–73 n.9 (Ariz. 1984), respectively).
54. Laney, 57 P.3d at 1017–19.
55. Id. at 1018 (quoting JEAN BICKMORE WHITE, CHARTER FOR STATEHOOD: THE
STORY FOR UTAH’S STATE CONSTITUTION 46 (1996)).
56. Id.; see also UTAH CONST. art. 6, §§ 22, 28, art. 7, § 29, art. 16, § 5. The fact that
some sections were drafted to restrict the legislature does not mean that all sections must be
interpreted as broadly as possible to do the same. Instead, the legislature meant what is said
(i.e. that the legislature should be restricted where the Constitution specifically says it
should be).
57. Id. This argument follows from the “Modeled or Borrowed Statute Rule,” a textual
interpretation tool used by courts. See Zerbe v. State, 578 P.2d 597 (ARK. 1978).
58. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
59. Laney, 57 P.3d at 1018; see also infra Part IV.B.
60. Laney, 57 P.3d at 1018.
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2. Why the special interests assumption proves unwarranted
The court’s reliance on other state histories 61 hurts its theory
more than it helps it. Kentucky is the perfect example. Kentucky first
adopted its open courts clause in 1792 and readopted it in 1891. 62
During the 1890 convention, Kentucky’s delegates disagreed sharply
on how sweeping the clause’s protections were. 63 Delegate W.G.
Bullitt wanted the convention to adopt 64 what is now section 242 of
the Kentucky Constitution—providing that “corporations . . .
invested with the privilege of taking private property for public use,
shall make just compensation for property taken, injured, or
destroyed . . . . according to the course of the common law.” 65 But
delegate George Washington argued against the section, claiming it
was duplicitous due to Kentucky’s takings and open courts clauses. 66
He proclaimed:
For every “legal injury” there is a remedy. So that, not simply upon
common law principles, but in virtue of [the open courts clause],
there is a right of recovery . . . . The remedies now afforded seem
to me to be ample . . . . therefore, [section 242] . . . seems to me
to be uncalled for . . . . 67

Another delegate, J.F. Askew, responded by saying, “[F]or
injuries recognized by law you now have your remedy; but I tell you
he knows that the common law in this respect could be repealed by
the Legislature. There is no principle in the common law made
sacred by the Constitution.” 68 Bullitt later explained that Section 242
was necessary because:
In Kentucky, if an individual constructs on his own property things
which would damage your property, you have a right of action at

61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1017–19.
Perkins v. Ne. Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Ky. 1991).
4 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION
ASSEMBLED AT FRANKFORT, ON THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1890, TO ADOPT, AMEND
OR CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 4725–27, 4743–44 (1890)
[hereinafter KENTUCKY DEBATES].
64. Id. at 4723–61.
65. KY. CONST. § 242 (emphasis added).
66. KENTUCKY DEBATES, supra note 63, at 4725–27.
67. Id. at 4727.
68. Id.
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common law; but if a railroad constructs those impediments that
interfere with the right of enjoyment of you or your own land, you
have not a right of action, because the Legislature has authorized
the railroad to construct its bed in the way that it had
been constructed. 69

In the end, the convention agreed with Bullitt and Askew and
adopted section 242. 70 True, Kentucky and other states were
attempting to restrict legislative power and prevent corruption by
big business. But they were not confident that the open courts clause
could achieve that goal. Instead, they chose to adopt other
provisions to protect their rights. 71 If states that were antagonistic
towards legislatures did not believe open courts clauses could protect
the common law, it is unlikely that Utah did.
Utahns’ relationship with the legislature already differed from
any other state. For nearly fifty years, Utahns’ only friend in

69. Id. at 4743.
70. Id. at 4761.
71. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 54 (“The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the
amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property.”);
KY. CONST. § 196 (“No common carrier shall be permitted to contract for relief from its
common law liability.”) (emphasis added); KY. CONST. § 242 (“Municipal and other
corporations, and individuals invested with the privilege of taking private property for public
use, shall make just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed by them . . . . [t]he
amount of such damages shall, in all cases, be determined by a jury, according to the course of
the common law.”) (emphasis added). The other state history the Court cites to is Arizona’s
history. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1017 (Utah 2002) (citing Kenyon v. Hammer,
688 P.2d 961, 971–73 (1984)). But Arizona adopted more protective clauses as well. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. CONST. art. 18, § 6 (“The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be
abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.”); ARIZ.
CONST. art. 2, § 31 (“No law shall be enacted in this state limiting the amount of damages to
be recovered for causing the death or injury of any person.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. 18, § 3 (“It
shall be unlawful for any person, company, association, or corporation to require of its servants
or employees as a condition of their employment, or otherwise, any contract or agreement
whereby such person, company, association, or corporation shall be released or discharged from
liability or responsibility on account of personal injuries which may be received by such servants
or employees while in the service or employment of such person, company, association, or
corporation, by reason of the negligence of such person, company, association, corporation, or
the agents or employees thereof; and any such contract or agreement if made, shall be null and
void.”) (emphasis added). Kentucky interprets its open courts clause in conjunction with the
other clauses in its constitution explicitly limiting the legislature’s power to abrogate the
common law—clauses Utah did not adopt. It is also read in light of Kentucky’s founding
generation’s disdain for its legislature—disdain that Utah did not have. See Perkins v. Ne. Log
Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 811–12 (Ky. 1991).
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government was the territorial legislature. 72 “The territorial
governors had been political [and federal] appointees, often poorly
equipped to cope with the problems of governing. The federal
judges were often hated and despised. The legislatures on the other
hand had been the champions of the public will and had enjoyed
public confidence.” 73 To the degree that Utahns did restrict their
legislature, it was because of experiences borne in other states. 74
Unlike Kentucky, whose “sole purpose” in framing a constitution
was to restrict the legislature, 75 Utah’s purpose was to attract outside
capital, grow the economy, and become a “magnet for new
enterprises.” 76 Thus, delegates were careful in framing their
new constitution.
Utah’s delegates did not worry that special interests would use
the legislature to avoid liability for injury. Delegate Ryan, after
commenting on recent injuries in mines, stated that “some
legislation in that direction would probably be all that would
be necessary.” 77
The Laney court points out that Utah did not adopt a more
limited open courts clause like Washington’s. 78 But what is more
telling is that Utah did not adopt any of the clauses that would have
provided real protection for remedies and causes of action, like the
clauses from Wyoming 79 or Kentucky did. 80 “Delegates were given
copies of all forty-four state constitutions, and they frequently

72. MARTIN BERKELEY HICKMAN, UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 74 (1954).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 74–75.
75. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
76. Jean Bickmore White, So Bright the Dream: Economic Prosperity and the Utah
Constitutional Convention, 63–4 U. HIST. QUARTERLY 320, 328 (Fall 1995).
77. 2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION
ASSEMBLED AT SALT LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 1895, TO ADOPT A
CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 1047 (1898).
78. Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1018 (Utah 2002).
79. See, e.g., WYO. CONST. art. 9, § 4 (“For any injury to person or property caused by
wilful [sic] failure to comply with the provisions of this article, or laws passed in pursuance
hereof, a right of action shall accrue to the party injured, for the damage sustained
thereby . . . .”) (emphasis added).
80. See supra note 71.
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referred to them.” 81 As a result, they most likely knew about these
clauses, and they would have included them had they wanted to.
Furthermore, delegates knew how to protect causes of action.
They did so when they approved Utah’s wrongful death clause,
which stated that “[t]he right of action to recover damages for
injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated.” 82 But the
delegates did not protect other causes of action. 83 Thus, it is unlikely
Utah’s adoption of the open courts clause was part of its effort to
restrict legislative power and prevent special interest corruption. To
whatever extent the state was worried about big business escaping
liability, this was limited to wrongful death actions.
B. The Common Law Assumption
The Laney court’s special interest assumption is even more
incredible after considering the assumption it relies upon: that
Utah’s founding generation gave a common-law interpretation to
the open courts clause. 84 As will be shown below, the court offers no
historical evidence for this assumption. The only supporting evidence
is from Justice Stewart’s opinion in Craftsman and outside research
by American history scholars—if the country as a whole gave a
common-law interpretation to the clause, then arguably Utah may
have as well. But even that evidence is merely circumstantial. A
thorough review of Utah history shows that Utahns ignored,
derided, and even attempted to abrogate the common law. Thus, the

81. White, supra note 76, at 322 n.3. Before 1895, Utah had already drafted several
constitutions and had attempted statehood a number of times. “The draft constitutions of
1849, 1856, 1862, and 1869 are almost identical documents and all bear a striking
resemblance to the Illinois constitution of 1812.” HICKMAN, supra note 47, at 13. The
constitutions of 1872, 1882, and 1887 were taken principally from the Nevada constitution.
Id. at 14–15. Utah’s open courts clause was most likely copied from the Connecticut
constitution. See CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (“All courts shall be open, and every person, for
an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”). But it was slightly
changed during the convention debates to remove “sale” and add “unnecessary” to the last
clause. 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION
ASSEMBLED AT SALT LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 1895, TO ADOPT A
CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 304–06 (1898).
82. UTAH CONST. art. 16, § 5.
83. See UTAH CONST.
84. See supra Part III.A.
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notion that they interpreted the open courts clause to protect the
common law is not only improbable but absurd.
1. The argument in support of the common law assumption
Outside scholars note that the common law played a leading role
in America’s war for independence and served as a moral justification
for the Revolution. 85 America’s founding generation recognized that
they were rebelling against Parliament’s law, 86 but they believed
themselves to be preserving an even older law—the common law. 87
“It was Parliament’s attempts in 1760s and seventies, as Jefferson
said, ‘to make law where they found none, and to submit us at one
stroke to a whole system no particle of which has it’s [sic]
foundation in the Common Law’ that Americans were resisting.” 88
In other words, Americans believed it was England who had rebelled
against the law; not them. “[F]or example, in 1761, James Otis . . .
argu[ed] that ‘writs of assistance’ (general search warrants)
authorized by Britain’s Navigation Act were unconstitutional
because they violated the common law precept that ‘a man’s house is
his castle.’” 89 Otis was not alone in his belief that England had
violated common-law rights. Indeed, “[t]he persistent appeals to the
common law in the constitutional struggles leading up to the
American Revolution ‘created a regard for its virtues that seems
almost mystical.’” 90
Winning independence from England was only the beginning of
America’s struggle to preserve common-law rights. Immediately
after the war, Americans began the work of drafting the first state
constitutions. 91 In writing their state constitutions, early legislatures
granted themselves plenary power, believing they were different than

85. Ned Miltenberg, The Revolutionary ‘Right to a Remedy,’ 34 TRIAL 48, 48–49
(Mar. 1998).
86. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787
265 (1969).
87. Miltenberg, supra note 85, at 49.
88. WOOD, supra note 86, at 265.
89. Miltenberg, supra note 85, at 49 (citing 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 247–48
(Charles Francis Adams ed., 1856)).
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 4–5 (1977)).
91. Id. at 49–50.
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the despots they saw as Parliament. 92 But of course, it did not take
long before early state legislatures began to abuse their new-found
power. 93 They began to pass laws confiscating property, suspending
creditor’s rights, and staying and reversing court judgments. 94 “In
fact, ‘depriving people of common law causes of action for damages
was not uncommon.’ . . . In Vermont, for example, such legislative
edicts eventually ‘stopp[ed] nine-tenths of all causes [of action] in
the state.” 95 In response to this legislative tyranny, early states went
to work “revamp[ing] their state constitutions.” 96 The result was a
constitutional system of checks and balances, separation of powers,
and guarantees of rights—one of which was the open courts clause. 97
It is possible then that the same feelings and political climate
present during America’s founding survived through the decades to
Utah’s founding. As evidence of Utahns’ respect for the common
law, Justice Stewart cites three Utah Territory Supreme Court
cases 98—each stating that the common law was extended over the
territory. 99 He also notes that many territorial supreme court cases
applied common-law principles, 100 as well as the fact that Utah’s
Declaration of Rights cannot be understood without reference to its
common-law heritage. 101 As Justice Stewart so aptly put it, “The

92. Id. at 50.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (first alteration in original) (citing WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF
THE COMMON LAW 91–91 (1975)) (citing WOOD, supra note 86, at 407).
96. Id. at 51.
97. Id.
98. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1209–10
(Utah 1999) (citing Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R., 1 Utah 232, 234 (1875); First Nat’l Bank of
Utah v. Kinner, 1 Utah 100, 107 (1873); People v. Green, 1 Utah 11, 13–14 (1876)).
99. Thomas, 1 Utah at 234 (1875) (“Although the Common Law has not been
adopted in this Territory by any Statute, we entertain no doubt that it should be regarded as
prevailing here . . . .”); First Nat. Bank of Utah, 1 Utah at 107 (“They have tacitly agreed
upon maxims and principles of the Common Law suited to their conditions and consistent
with the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and they only wait recognition by the
courts to become the Common Law of the Territory.”); Green, 1 Utah at 13 (“[Common law]
is most positively extended over the Territory of Utah by the express language of the Act of
Congress providing a Territorial Government for Utah, approved September
9th, 1850 . . . .”).
100. Craftsman, 974 P.2d at 1210.
101. Id.
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warp and the woof of the law in the Territory was the
common law.” 102
2. Why the common law assumption proves absurd
But even if all the above evidence is taken as true, it does not
prove that Utah’s founding generation understood the open courts
clause to carry a common-law interpretation. First, it is far from clear
as to whether America’s founding generation interpreted the clause
in this way. And second, even if they did, Utah’s founding
generation did not.
First, it is unlikely that America’s founding generation
interpreted the open courts clauses to mean common-law injuries
instead of legal injuries. The only evidence in support of the
common-law interpretation is the general feelings of America’s
populous. 103 There is no statement or writing directly linking the
open courts clause to those feelings, let alone a common-law
interpretation of the clause. True, America’s founding generation did
attempt to prevent the abuses of England and early state legislatures.
But many of those abuses are prevented by the separation of powers
and contractual obligations clauses, 104 or even a “legal injury”
interpretation of the open courts clause. Further, some states with
open courts clauses have other constitutional clauses expressly
allowing modification of the common law. 105 Delaware, the first state
to ever adopt an open courts clause, is one of these states. 106
Delaware’s constitution declares that “[t]he common law . . . shall
102. Id.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 85–102.
104. Clauses like these resolve the problem of legislatures suspending or reversing court
judgments and interfering with creditor’s rights. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 9, § 17 (1790)
(“That no ex post facto law, nor any law impairing contracts, shall be made.”); Banesboro
Borough v. Speice, 40 Pa. Super. 609, 612 (1909) (“Retrospective laws may be supported
when they impair no contract and disturb no vested right, but only vary remedies, cure defects
in proceedings otherwise fair, and do not vary existing obligations contrary to their situation
when entered into and when prosecuted . . . .”) (citation omitted).
105. W. VA. CONST. art. 11, § 8 (1863) (“Such parts of the common law . . . shall be
and continue the law of this State until altered or repealed by the Legislature.”); WIS. CONST.
art. 14, § 13 (1848) (“[T]he common law . . . shall be and continue part of the law of this
state until altered or suspended by the legislature.”).
106. DEL. CONST. art. 25 (1776). See also Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1308 (explaining
that author of first open courts provision was not trying to “limit the power of the legislature
in prescribing remedies”).
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remain in force, unless [it] shall be altered by a future law of the
legislature.” 107 These clauses are in direct conflict with a common-law
interpretation of the open courts clause. Given the lack of any direct
evidence in support of the common-law interpretation, and the
evidence against such an interpretation, it is more likely than not that
America’s founding generation did not interpret the open courts
clauses to mean common-law injuries.
But even if America’s founding generation gave a common-lawinjuries interpretation to the open courts clause, Utah’s founding
generation did not. Utahns’ interpretation of the open courts clause
would have been similar to interpretations by nineteenth-century
courts. But these interpretations in nineteenth-century case law are
conflicting on whether open courts clauses protect common-law
causes of action and remedies. 108
For example, in Hotchkiss v. Porter, the Connecticut Supreme
Court chose one interpretation. The court dealt with a statute
affecting the common-law cause of action for libel. 109 The trial court
held that the act of 1855—declaring that “unless the plaintiff shall
prove malice in fact he shall recover nothing but his actual
damage” 110—changed the common-law rule for collecting general
damages. 111 But the Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed:
It is also recognized in the declaration of rights which is placed in
the very front of the constitution of this state, and it is there
provided that “every person, for an injury done him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and
right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.” This
right, thus existing and thus secured, legislative authority can not
[sic] take away, abridge or impair, and any attempt to do it will be
inoperative and void. 112

107. DEL. CONST. art. 25 (1776) (emphasis added).
108. Compare Brown v. Board of Levee Comm’rs, 50 Miss. 468, 480 (1874) (“The [due
course of law] does not demand that the laws existing at any point of time shall be irrepealable,
or that any forms of remedies shall necessarily continue.”), with Thirteenth & Fifteenth St.
Passenger Ry. Co. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 475, 482 (1880) (“A [statutory] limitation of recovery
to a sum less than the actual damage, is palpably in conflict with the right to a remedy by due
course of law.”).
109. Hotchkiss v. Porter, 30 Conn. 414, 418 (1862) (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 419.
111. Id. at 416.
112. Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
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The court interpreted the statute to conform to the common law. 113
To interpret it otherwise would make it unconstitutional. 114
Hotchkiss stands in stark contrast to Templeton v. Linn County. In
Templeton, the plaintiff attempted to sue a county. 115 But the
territorial statute making the county liable had been repealed since
the adoption of Oregon’s constitution. 116 The plaintiff argued “that
by [the open courts clause], the legislature of the state was disabled
from repealing said territorial statute without enacting another,
which would be a substantial equivalent for the law as it then stood
on that subject.” 117 But the Oregon Supreme Court disagreed,
stating that “[a]s a proposition of constitutional law, [the plaintiff’s]
contention seems startling . . . no judicial authority was cited upon
the argument in support of it, and . . . it may be safely assumed that
none exists.” 118 The court held that Oregon’s open courts clause
protected only vested rights. Thus, the statute was constitutional. 119
Nineteenth-century courts were not alone in their confusion. As
already noted, delegates to the Kentucky Constitutional Convention
also disagreed on the open courts clause’s proper interpretation. 120
Whatever the clause’s meaning was to America’s founding
generation, these examples show that Americans disagreed on its
interpretation a century later. Thus, Utah’s founding generation’s
understanding of the clause cannot be based upon America’s
founding generation’s understanding of the clause. Instead, it must
be determined from Utah’s own history whether the clause carried
the common-law interpretation’s meaning. And as the argument
below will show, Utah’s history provides a second reason why the
state did not adopt this meaning.
113. See id.
114. Id. 419–22.
115. Templeton v. Linn County, 29 P. 795, 795–96 (Or. 1892).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 796.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 797. Concurring with the court, Justice Bean noted that at the time of the
constitution’s adoption, a municipal corporation could be held liable by both common law and
statutory law, id. (Bean, J., concurring), yet in O’Harra v. City of Portland, 3 Or. 525 (1869),
the court upheld a statute exempting the city of Portland from liability. Id. He concluded that
“[t]he provision of the constitution under consideration in [Templeton] does not seem to have
been noticed or considered by the court in O’Harra v. City of Portland, but the result of that
decision is fatal to plaintiff’s contention here.” Id.
120. See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text.
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Utah’s unique history of opposing the common law sets it apart
from every other state in the Union. This unique history is primarily
due to Utah’s Mormon history. Upon settling in Utah, the
Mormon Church:
[P]erformed the full complement of governmental functions: from
the granting of permission to engage in business, to the levying of
taxes, the building of public roads and bridges, and the provision
for the welfare of the needy; the definition and provision of
punishment for a full schedule of crimes, ranging from adultery to
trading with the Indians; the exercise of unlimited power to
adjudicate in civil and criminal cases; the appointment of law
enforcement and other officials; the creation of a militia. 121

A few years later, Utahns established the State of Deseret, adopting
“many of the enactments of the church-government” from before. 122
The same occurred when Congress granted Utah territorial status:
“the territorial legislature took over . . . [and] in turn, adopted all
laws of Deseret.” 123 Needless to say, the Church exercised enormous
influence on civil life and the law.
Utahns view on law and its purposes did not match the common
law’s view. “[Mormons’] conception of law was not as a protector of
private rights nor as a regulator of civil society. To them, individual
rights were subordinate to the larger group goal . . . to build the
‘Kingdom of God on Earth . . . .’” 124 Laws “acquired legitimacy only
when they” furthered that goal. 125 In the words of historian Edward
W. Tullidge, “[The Mormons’] judicial economy was after the
patterns of the New Testament rather than after the patterns
of Blackstone.” 126
As a result, Utahns ignored the common law for property rights.
For example, early Church actions “amounted to an abrogation of
the common law in regard to property and riparian water rights.” 127

121. Orma Linford, The Mormons, the Law, and the Territory of Utah, 23 AM. J. LEGAL
HIS. 213, 220 (July 1979).
122. Id. at 220–21.
123. Id. at 221.
124. Id. at 223.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 232.
127. Id. at 224.
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Upon entering the valley, Brigham Young declared the “land law.” 128
Under that law, the Church granted each man a plot of land that, if
not cared for, was taken away. 129 Utahns also made water and timber
“community property.” 130 Indeed, “[f]ederal land policies were not
enforced in Utah until 1869.” 131
Utahns also ignored the common law in the field of criminal law.
An example of this is demonstrated by Howard Egan’s trial. 132 Egan
was accused of murdering his wife’s lover. At common law, Egan was
guilty of a “premeditated killing.” 133 But Egan’s representative,
George A. Smith, 134 argued that “Egan’s action was justified under
Utah’s ‘mountain common law.’” 135 The principle the court should
apply, he argued, was that “[t]he man who seduces his neighbor’s
wife must die, and her nearest relative must kill him!” 136 Smith’s
argument was bolstered by a case from the previous year where a
man, accused of a similar murder, was acquitted and his adulterous

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 223.
Michael W. Homer, The Judiciary and the Common Law in Utah, 1850-61, 21
DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT 97, 100 (Spring 1988).
133. Id.
134. Smith was not an attorney. Utahns disliked lawyers just as much as they disliked the
common law and courts in general. Linford, supra note 121, at 228–30. It was said that some
lawyers “returned to the East poorer lawyers than when they left—if such a thing is possible.”
Id. at 230. This same attitude prevailed until after statehood. This is why Utah’s open courts
clause, unlike any other state’s clause, says that “no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.” UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 11.
135. Homer, supra note 132. Smith’s reference to “mountain common law” may be
related to Brigham Young’s teachings on the common law. See Linford, supra note 121, at
224–25 n.49. Young was once asked whether the Utah Territory had adopted the common
law of England. Young responded that they had not. He explained:
We have a few Territorial laws, principally directory in their provisions and
operation. And we have a common law which is written upon the tablets of the
heart, and “printed on the inmost parts, whose executors and righteousness, and
whose exactors are peace”; one of its golden precepts is “Do unto others as you
would they should do unto you.” This common law we seek to establish throughout the
valleys of the mountains; and shall continue our exertions for its adoption as long as
we shall continue to exist upon the earth, until all nations shall bow in humble
acquientscence [sic] thereto.
Id. at 224 (second emphasis added) (quoting 14 MILLENNIAL STAR, May 19, 1852, at 215).
136. Linford, supra note 121, at 224–25 n.49.
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wife excommunicated. 137 The court rejected this argument but
“agree[d] that the common law did not apply in Utah.” 138 Egan was
later acquitted on different grounds. But the very next year, Utah’s
territorial legislature passed a law justifying Egan’s actions. 139
Commenting on this same topic, Church leader Orson Pratt
denounced the rest of the country that “recognized the common law
and merely winked at adultery.” 140 Utahns were different, they were
“governed by the laws of God and meted out Old Testament
punishment for moral transgressions.” 141
The common law was also rejected in “what was probably the
first law school of the territory.” 142 The school was organized by
Judge Snow, one of the three territorial supreme court justices. 143
Snow taught that “they had ‘a right to make such laws as suited
[their] own Convenience Notions and circumstances’ and that such
laws could be enacted ‘without any regard to the Common Law of
England or the laws which any of the states had adopted.’” 144
It did not take long, however, before Utahns stopped simply
ignoring the common law and started fighting it. Two of the
territory’s initial supreme court justices, non-Mormons, were forced
to flee the state after a dispute with Brigham Young. 145 They later
revealed that the Mormons were practicing polygamy—an act illegal
at common law 146—and challenged Mormons to argue its legality in
a “national forum.” 147 In response, Brigham Young went to the

137. Homer, supra note 132, at 100.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 101.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 100.
143. Id. The territorial supreme court was originally made up of three justices. But the
two other justices, who were non-Mormons, “lasted only a little more than month before
fleeing the Territory in fear of their lives.” Linford, supra note 121, at 222. See also Homer,
supra note 132, at 98–99 (explaining in greater detail the two justices’ short stay and reasons
for leaving).
144. Homer, supra note 132, at 100–01.
145. See supra note 143.
146. Homer, supra note 132, at 98 (“The common law provided that marriage while
having a living husband or wife was a felony, and the second marriage was void.”)
(citation omitted).
147. Id. at 101.
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territorial legislature, asking them “to prohibit all judges from using
common-law precedent.” 148 He proclaimed:
String a Judge, or Justice, of the legal mists and fog which
surround him in this day and age, leave him no nook, or corner of
precedent, or common law ambiguous enactments, the accumulation
of ages, wherein to shelter, and it is my opinion, that unrighteous
decisions would seldom be given. 149

The territorial legislature responded and, in 1854, passed a
statute declaring as much:
[A]ll questions of law, the meaning of writings other than laws, and
the admissibility of testimony, shall be decided by the Court; and
no laws or parts of laws shall be read, argued, cited, or adopted in any
Court, during any trial, except those enacted by the Governor and
Legislative Assembly of this Territory, and those passed by the
Congress of the United States when applicable; and no report,
decision, or doings of any Court shall be read, argued, cited, or
adopted as precedent in any other trial. 150

The First Presidency, the Church’s governing authority, followed
up this legislation with a message to the Saints to “carry on all of
their activities ‘without any contaminating influence of Gentile
Amalgamation, laws and traditions.’” 151 The First Presidency
declared the common law to have no application in the Territory. 152
Soon thereafter, Utah’s newest chief justice, John Fitch
Kinney, 153 a non-Mormon, held the territorial legislature’s statute
illegal under the Organic Act—the law granting Utah territorial
status. 154 “Mormons were furious.” 155 Church leaders quickly
responded claiming that “Congress had given the legislature the

148. Id.
149. Linford, supra note 121, at 225 (emphasis added).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Homer, supra note 132, at 102.
152. Id.
153. To learn more about Kinney, see Michael W. Homer, The Federal Bench and
Priesthood Authority: The Rise and Fall of John Fitch Kinney’s Early Relationship with the
Mormons, 13 J. MORMON HIS. 88 (1986).
154. Homer, supra note 132, at 102. The Organic Act granted the territorial supreme
court and district courts “chancery as well as common law jurisdiction.” Id.
155. Id.
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‘privilege of excluding the common law at pleasure.’” 156 Heber C.
Kimball went so far as to say that the federal judges “want all hell
here.” 157
In subsequent decisions, Kinney continued his campaign of
forcing the common law on Utahns. 158 Ironically, Justice Stewart
cites one of those decisions as evidence that the common law was the
“warp and the woof of the law in the Territory.” 159 But the territorial
legislature disagreed. “[They] removed Kinney from the Salt Lake
judicial district and assigned him to remote Carson Valley, later part
of Nevada.” 160 In response, Kinney complained to President James
Buchanan. 161 His “complaints helped convince [the President] to
replace Young and send an army to Utah.” 162 The case Justice
Stewart cites helped ignite the Utah War.
The battle over imposition of the common law continued for
several more decades. Congress “prohibited bigamy in 1862 and
polygamy” in the 1880s. 163 Federal officials sought to imprison
Church authorities and attack Church finances. This was made
possible after “the federal government bestowed unprecedented
powers on its officials.” 164 They even went so far as to ban Mormons
from serving on juries. It was during this time period, that the
territorial supreme court decided several other cases holding the
common law applicable in the territory. 165 Thus, Justice Stewart was
correct when he stated that “volumes of the Supreme Court Reports
for the Territory of Utah are replete with the application of common
law principles.” 166 But those common law principles were not applied
by Utahns; they were imposed by federally appointed judges.

156. Id. at 103.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 103–04.
159. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1210 (Utah
1999) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing People v. Green, 1 Utah 11, 13–14 (1876)).
160. Homer, supra note 132, at 104.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 107.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1210 (Utah
1999) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Even after the common law was forced upon Utahns, they did
their best to limit its effects. 167 In 1882, the territorial legislature
passed a statute stating, “‘Whenever there is any variance between
the rules of equity and the rules of common law, in reference to the
same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail.’” 168 This statute was in
line with Young’s earlier request to prohibit the common law. He
said, “Let all of our laws have no other practice or rule of decision,
save it be in the discretion vested in the bosom of the Court.” 169
Two years later, the territorial legislature also “declared that the
common law rule that statutes in derogation of the common law
shall be strictly construed had no application to the code of
civil procedure.” 170
Utahns not only tried to limit the effects of the common law in
court, they tried to avoid court altogether. 171 “[Mormons] did not
believe in going to law with one another. They took their cases to
the ‘High Council’ and the courts of their bishops, or Ward
Councils . . . .” 172 These Church courts were not bound by the
common law. In Church courts, “religious perspectives [were]
determinative in conflicts arising out of contractual or tortious
disputes.” 173 The more federal pressure increased, the “more
developed” Church courts came to be. 174 The Church courts
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over Mormons until as late as 1900. 175

167. Linford, supra note 121, at 227.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 225.
170. Id. at 227.
171. See generally id. at 230–33.
172. Id. at 232. “[Non-Mormons] occasionally took their civil claims to Church courts
as well.” Robert E. Riggs, Legal and Judicial History of the Church, HAROLD B. LEE LIBRARY,
http://eom.byu.edu/index.php/Legal_and_Judicial_History_of_the_Church
(last
updated 2014).
173. Edwin B. Firmage, Religion & the Law: The Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth
Century, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 765, 766 (1991). For more information on church courts, see
id. at 788–98 (explaining church courts’ structure, jurisdiction, opposition to lawyers and
technicalities, decisional standards, and substantive law). Church courts were also explained to
Congress when Congress considered and rejected Utah’s 1887 application for statehood.
UTAH STATEHOOD: REASONS WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED 8–9 (1887).
174. Firmage, supra note 174, at 788.
175. Id. at 792. Any Mormon who went to civil court before a Church court was subject
to church sanctions. Id.
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It was not until after statehood, in 1898, that Utahns adopted
the common law. 176 But even then, it was only adopted in “so far as it
was not repugnant to, or in conflict with . . . the constitution or laws
of [the] state.” 177 As Justice Zimmerman noted in Craftsman, “An
interpretation of [the open courts clause] as constitutionalizing in
1896 the common law, which was not even qualifiedly made the law
of the state until 1898, is inconsistent with this history.” 178 Through
this statute, the legislature “delegated to state courts the authority to
develop the common law.” 179 And what the legislature delegates, the
legislature may take away. 180
Given Utahns animus against the common law before statehood,
it seems doubtful that they would have either meant for or
interpreted the open courts clause to protect common-law causes of
action. The 1898 statute delegating the common law evidences
Utahns’ belief that the common law’s development—including its
abrogation—was ultimately in the hands of the legislature, not the
judiciary. With the common-law assumption proven untrue, the
court’s theory—that Utahns meant for the clause to limit legislative
power and prevent special interest corruption—does not hold water.
That being the case, the question then arises: What is the original
meaning of the open courts clause?
IV. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF UTAH’S OPEN COURTS CLAUSE
As shown below, when adopting the open courts clause, Utah’s
founding generation most likely understood “injury” to mean causes
of action currently recognized at law—giving the clause a more
procedural interpretation. Such a reading fits the plain meaning of
the clause and lines up with the history preceding the clause. Given
that meaning, the clause protects three general rights: (1) access to
176. Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1232–33
(Utah 1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 1232 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1 (1998)).
178. Id. at 1233.
179. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Fostering Mutual Respect and Cooperation between
State Courts and State Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to a Tort Tug of War, 103 W. VA. L.
REV. 1, 11 (2000) (explaining how state legislatures enacted “reception statutes”) (emphasis
in original).
180. Id. (“Many ‘reception statutes’ made clear, however, that the power to develop tort
law that was delegated to the courts could be retrieved by the legislature at any time.”)
(emphasis in original).
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courts, (2) procedural due process, and (3) vested rights. 181 Given
Utahns’ history, protection of these rights would have greatly
concerned the state, unlike protection of common-law causes
of action.
A. The Right to Access Courts
The right to access courts was likely the impetus of open courts
clauses across the nation. The first clauses were adopted by colonial
states shortly after the American Revolution. 182 Their adoption was in
response to England’s abuses preceding the war. 183 For some time,
colonists had complained about the Crown’s interference with the
judiciary and the judges’ lack of independence. 184 This reached a
tipping point with the Stamp Act, whose “effect was to close the
courts to civil litigation altogether.” 185 Many colonists refused to
obey the order, including Thomas McKean, an author of the first
open courts clause. 186
But not all of the colonies were so bold. “In Massachusetts, John
Adams appeared before the Governor’s Council to urge, albeit
unsuccessfully, that the courts should be reopened in defiance of the
Stamp Act.” 187 For support, he cited the Magna Carta and Chapter
29 of Coke’s Second Institute—the documents that originated the
open courts clause. 188 “Magna Carta Chapter 40 provides: ‘Nulli

181. The last part of the clause would also protect the right to self-representation, but
that is not addressed here.
182. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 9; MASS. CONST. part 1, art. 11.
183. See Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1303–05.
184. Id. at 1300–07. For example, colonists complained that the Act of Settlement—
removing English judges’ salaries from the Crown’s control—did not extend to colonial
judges. Similarly, they complained that their judges did not have tenure. Id. These complaints
were eventually formalized in the Declaration of Independence, where Jefferson wrote that the
King had “made judges dependent on his will alone, for tenure of their offices, and the
amount and payment of their salaries.” Id. (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 11 (U.S. 1776)).
185. Id. at 1303.
186. “A Delaware judge at the time American courts were closed to civil litigation
because of the Stamp Act, McKean most likely was responsible for inserting the open courts
clause into the first bill of rights when he drafted the Delaware Declaration of Rights in 1776.”
Id. at 1298.
187. Id. at 1304.
188. Id. (emphasis in original).
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vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus, rectum aut justiciam.’” 189
(‘To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or
justice.’) Expounding on this provision, Coke’s Second
Institute states:
[E]very Subject of this Realm, for injury done to him in bonis,
terris, vel persona [goods, lands, or person], by any other Subject,
be he Ecclesiastical, or Temporal, Free, or Bond, Man, or Woman,
Old, or Young, or be he outlawed, excommunicated, or any other
without exception, may take his remedy by the course of the Law,
and have justice, and right for the injury done him, freely without
sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay. 190

Thus, when the colonists were denied access to the courts, it was
to these words that Adams cited, proclaiming “We deny no Man
Justice, we delay no Man Justice.” 191 The Stamp Act was eventually
repealed. But its effects were not forgotten. The first states adopted
open courts clauses patterned after Coke’s Second Institute,
understanding those words to protect the right to access courts. 192
Utah’s founding generation understood their clause to mean the
same, as evidenced by the clause’s command that “[a]ll courts shall
be open.” 193

189. Id. at 1286 n.38.
190. Id. at 1313 (citing SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 55–56 (photo, reprint 1979) (1642)) (emphasis in original). For
more information on Lord Coke’s inspiration for writing this provision see id. at 1292–96
(explaining Coke’s fight against the Crown for an independent judiciary).
191. Id. at 1304–05 (citing John Adams, Argument before Governor Bernard and the
Council in Favor of Opening the Courts (Dec. 20, 1765), in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 152–53
(Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1977)).
192. See id. at 1299–1311 (explaining events leading up to the first open courts clause).
Some early states expressly guaranteed the right to access courts. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 9 (“All courts shall be open”). But other states, in concurrence with Adams, seem to have
understood Coke’s words as already protecting that right. For example, the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, authored by Adams himself, has no express right to open courts. MASS.
CONST. part 1, art. 11 (“Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy,
by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged
to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably
to the laws.”).
193. UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 11.
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B. Due Process Rights
The first part of Utah’s open court’s clause guarantees access to
courts. But access to courts alone was not enough. Utahns also
wanted to protect their rights to remedies and procedural due
process. 194 This reading is evidenced by the plain meaning of Utah’s
open courts clause, which commands that “every person . . . shall
have remedy by due course of law.” And as will be shown below, this
reading is also supported by historical context and Utahns’ adoption
of similar wording after their struggles in Missouri.
Utahns’ mindset cannot be understood without knowledge of
their Mormon history. Mormons first arrived in Missouri in 1831,
after Joseph Smith, the Mormon Prophet, received a revelation that
they were to build Zion there. 195 Instead of finding Zion, they found
opposition and hostility. 196 “The ‘old settlers’ were from a different
background than the incoming [Mormons], and it was natural that
cultural, political, religious, and economic differences arose.” 197
These differences soon spilled over into mob violence. 198 The
Mormons eventually fled the state to nearby Illinois and, from there,
to Utah. 199 “Mormons tend to view the Missouri period from 18311839 as the darkest era in their church’s history.” 200
One of the reasons the Missouri time period was so trying for
the Mormons was their inability to obtain remedies and due process
194. Examples of such due process rights are given by Justice Zimmerman in Craftsman.
He states that “barriers to the courthouse such as extremely high filing fees, extraordinarily
short statutes of limitation, or arduous pretrial procedures” violate the open courts clause. The
clause also “would not permit the courts or legislature to recognize a legal right . . . [while]
entirely deny[ing] a remedy.” Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d
1194, 1239 (Utah 1999) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
195. Matthew Lund, The Vox Populi is the Vox Dei: American Localism and the Mormon
Expulsion from Jackson County, Missouri 1 (2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Utah State
University), available at http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/1240.
196. Id.
197. CHURCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, CHURCH HISTORY IN THE FULLNESS OF TIMES:
STUDENT MANUAL 130 (2003), available at https://www.lds.org/bc/content/shared/
content/english/pdf/language-materials/32502_eng.pdf?lang=eng.
198. One motive for the mob violence was Missourian’s desire to obtain Mormon
property. For more information, see Jeffrey N. Walker, Mormon Land Rights in Caldwell and
Daviess Counties and the Mormon Conflict of 1838: New Findings and New Understandings, 47
BYU STUDIES 4 (2008).
199. See generally, CHURCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, supra note 197.
200. Lund, supra note 195, at 1.
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from Missouri courts. Missourians formed mobs to destroy Mormon
property and violently forced them from the state. Despite
Missourian courts being open, Mormons never obtained redress. 201
One such example was the mob attack on October 31, 1833. 202 A
mob approached the home of Mormon leader David Whitmer. They
“drew his wife out of the house by the hair and proceeded to throw
down the house.” 203 Mormon settlers were able to flee. But before
they could, they were “whipt and beat, in a savage manner.” 204 The
mob ended up unroofing or destroying ten to twelve homes that
night. 205 The very next night, the mob returned to ransack more
homes and stores.
[O]ne of [the mob members], Richard McCarty, was “caught in
the act of throwing rocks in at the door, while the goods lay strung
around him in the street. He was immediately taken before Samuel
Weston, Esq. and a warrant requested . . . but his justiceship
refused to do anything in the case, and M’Carty was
then liberated.” 206

State newspapers condemned the mob violence and subsequent
refusal of the courts to grant redress. 207 One newspaper, the St. Louis
Advocate, argued that:
Whenever the [ordinary tribunals of] the country are found
incompetent to preserve the supremacy of the laws, the peace and
harmony of society . . . the Executive, as the [constant] guardian of
the laws and rights of the citizens, is bound to interpose and check
the evil. 208

The governor did eventually deploy the militia in an effort to
arrest and try those mob members accused of breaking the law. 209
But it was to no avail. The judge adjourned the prosecutions
concluding that “it was entirely unnecessary to investigate the

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 73.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 74 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 73–74.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 90.
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subject on the part of the State, as the jury were equally concerned
[or involved] in the outrages committed.” 210
“Mormons continued to seek [redress] through civil suit.” 211 The
governor encouraged them, writing: “The laws are sufficient to
afford a remedy for every injury of this kind.” 212 Thus, Edward
Partridge, a Mormon leader who had been assaulted by forty or
more men, filed suit for $50,000. 213 All of the defendants claimed
self-defense, “alleging that Partridge ‘single-handedly had threatened
each man “and would then and there have beat, bruised and ill
treated’” each one had they not defended themselves.” 214 In
defending themselves, Partridge “became a little covered and
besmeared with tar, pitch and feathers . . . doing no unnecessary
damage to [him].” 215 The court found the defendants liable. But the
judge only awarded Partridge “a peppercorn and one penny.” 216
Unable to obtain any redress in the courts, the Mormons were
eventually forced to leave the state. Before they left, it was heard said
by at least one judge “that there was no law for Mormons.” 217
It was during this time that the Mormons formally adopted a
form of the open courts clause. Although many of the Mormons
were in Missouri, church headquarters continued to be located in
Kirtland, Ohio. 218 There, on August 17, 1835, an assembly of the
Church gathered to formally accept a book of revelations titled the
Doctrine and Covenants. The Church also voted on and approved an
article titled Of Governments and Laws in General, which was
210. Id. at 90–91 (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Id. at 91.
212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not definitive whether Governor
Dunklin was referring to Missouri’s open courts clause when he said this. But his choice of
words is extremely similar to the clause. See MO. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (“That the courts of
justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person,
property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay.”) (emphasis added).
213. Lund, supra note 195, at 91–92.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. “Truth Will Prevail,” TIMES AND SEASONS, Jul. 15, 1843, at 267, available at
http://files.restorationbranches.org/AD%201830-1844/Times%20&%20Seasons/Volume%
204/Vol.%204%20No.%2017%20pp.%20257-272.pdf.
218. CHURCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS: STUDENT
MANUAL 344 (2001).
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published in the Doctrine and Covenants. 219 Verse eleven of that
article, mirroring the open courts clauses of the day, 220 declares, “We
believe that men should appeal to the civil law for redress of
all wrongs and grievances, where personal abuse is inflicted or the
right of property or character infringed, where such laws exist as will
protect the same . . . .” 221 This same verse continued to be published
in Mormon scriptures up through the time of statehood, and is still
published today.
The denial of legal remedies for the Mormons did not end in
Missouri. They were also denied legal remedies in Utah due to the
federal government’s attempts to shut down polygamy. 222 For
example, in one year, “the Utah Commission barred over twelve
thousand Mormons from voting in Utah. This was nearly one-fourth
of eligible Mormon voters.” 223 The Mormons sued but lost. The
court held that “the commission was legally powerless to exclude
voters, [thus] it was not legally liable for the acts of voting officials
who wrongfully obeyed” its orders. 224 Utah courts also denied
Mormons their due process rights and remedies when it came to the
rights of public office and receiving inheritances. 225
219. Id.
220. Open courts clauses were found in all of the states in which the Mormons resided.
OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 15; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12. Mormon
leaders also seem to have cited the Illinois open courts clause when responding to a libelous
press in Nauvoo, Illinois. See LEGRAND L. BAKER, MURDER OF THE MORMON PROPHET: THE
POLITICAL PRELUDE TO THE DEATH OF JOSEPH SMITH 347 n.467 (2011) (“[The Illinois
open courts clause] may have been referred to during the debate.”). Dallin H. Oaks notes that
the debate record citing the clause likely was an error. Dallin H. Oaks, The Suppression of the
Nauvoo Expositor, 9 UTAH L. REV. 862, 875 n.88 (1965). However, it is likely that the clause
was still referenced during the debate. Mormon leaders believed the press to be a nuisance and
relied on a passage of Blackstone’s Commentaries for support. That passage states that some
nuisances “require an immediate remedy; and cannot wait for the slow progress of the ordinary
forms of justice.” Id. at 887 (quoting Hart v. Mayor of Albany, 9 Wend. 571, 609–10 (N.Y.
Ct. Err. 1832)). It is conceivable that Mormon leaders saw the Illinois open courts clause as
justifying Blackstone and their actions since that clause gave them the right to “certain
remedy . . . promptly and without delay.” ILL. CONST. art. 8, § 12 (1818).
221. THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTERDAY SAINTS 134:11 (2013). Interestingly, both the Utah Constitution and The Doctrine and
Covenants place the open courts clause in the eleventh section of the respective texts.
222. Firmage, supra note 173, at 780–88 (“[F]ederal attempts to simplify and expedite
the conviction of polygamists routinely denied Mormons many of their fundamental rights.”).
223. Id. at 782.
224. Id. at 783.
225. Id. at 783–87.
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Given this history, it is clear that Mormons understood the
clause to protect remedies and due process rights. They were denied
those rights in Missouri and invoked the clause as proof that they
were being wronged. They would have understood the clause to
carry this same meaning when, as Utahns, they adopted it into the
Utah constitution. The Utah territory supreme court’s recent denial
of due process rights before statehood may have also motivated the
clause’s adoption.
C. Protection of Vested Rights
The last item that Utah’s founding generation would have
understood the open courts clause to protect is vested rights to
remedies. For example, vested rights to remedies means that a
legislature could not eliminate a plaintiff’s cause of action or remedy
during his pending case. At that point, the plaintiff already has a
vested right that the legislature cannot interfere with. “[E]ven the
most radical [modern] courts recognize that lawmakers cannot
deprive plaintiffs of vested rights.” 226 All nineteenth-century courts
recognized the same. 227 Thus, Utahns would have also interpreted
the open courts clause to protect vested rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The Utah Supreme Court’s substantive interpretation of the
open courts clause is wrong and needs correction. The court’s
common-law interpretation of the word “injury” lacks support. Utah
history reveals Utahns ignored the common law at first and actively
fought against it later. When Utahns were in control of their
government, they sought to eliminate the common law entirely
through both legislative action and judicial practice. And when they
lost governmental control due to federal pressure, they sought to
226. Schuman, supra note 4, at 1208.
227. See Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. 119, 137–39 (1843) (using clause to prevent the
legislature from interfering in slaves’ pending petition before the Chancery); Townsend v.
Townsend 7 Tenn. 1, 14–16 (1821) (using clause to strike down statute requiring judgment
creditors to either delay executing their judgments for two years or accept paper money);
Templeton v. Linn County, 29 P. 795, 797 (Or. 1892) (noting that open courts clause only
protects “[v]ested rights [which] are placed under constitutional protection, and cannot be
destroyed by legislation”); Commercial Bank of Natchez v. Chambers, 16 Miss. 9, 9 (1847)
(finding statute eliminating vested rights unconstitutional under open courts clause).
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limit the common law’s effects both by statute and avoidance of the
judicial system. Given this history, the belief that Utahns gave a
common-law interpretation to the clause is bordering on absurdity.
Equally unsupported is the court’s theory of why Utah’s
founding generation adopted the clause—so as to prevent special
interests from corrupting the legislature. First, this theory relies on a
common-law interpretation of the clause which has been proven
absurd for a state like Utah. Second, the state histories the court
relies on for this theory show that not even those states believed the
clause to have the effect the court now claims. Thus, it is unlikely
that Utahns held this belief. This is especially so given Utahns
different motivations for adopting a constitution.
Utahns most likely gave a procedural interpretation to the
clause—interpreting “injury” to mean causes of action currently
recognized at law. Such an interpretation would protect a right to
access courts, due process rights, and vested rights. This
interpretation is supported by America’s founding history—
explaining why the clause first started appearing in state
constitutions. It is also supported by nineteenth-century case law and
Utahns use of the clause in relation to the abuses suffered in
Missouri. Given this evidence, the Utah Supreme Court should
overturn Berry and the line of cases which follow. Only a procedural
interpretation of the open courts clause accords with the clause’s
original meaning.

Jarom R. Jones*

* J.D. candidate, April 2016, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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